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LANDLORD TORT LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA: ARE THE
RESTRICTIVE COMMON LAW DOCTRINES ON THEIR
WAY OUT?
INTRODUCTION
In Green v. Superior Court' the California Supreme Court held
that a "warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential
leases in this state and that the breach of such a warranty may be
raised as a defense in an unlawful detainer action." This comment
considers the implications of this holding in regard to a landlord's
liability in tort. The article briefly discusses the common law rules
concerning landlord tort liability and then considers whether the
California Supreme Court will continue to follow these rules. Final-
ly the article suggests that the Green decision, when read in light
of other recent California decisions, forecasts the imposition of strict
liability on commercial lessors of residential property.
THE Green DECISION
The landlord, Jack Sumski, commenced an unlawful detainer
action in San Francisco Small Claims Court against Green, the ten-
ant, seeking possession of the premises and $300 in back rent.
Green admitted not paying the rent but asserted as a defense the
landlord's failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition.
The Court awarded possession of the premises to the landlord and
damages of $225.
Green appealed to the superior court where a trial de novo was
held. In support of his claim of uninhabitability, Green submitted a
copy of an inspection report by the San Francisco Department
of Public Works which disclosed some 80 housing code violations.
Green also produced a departmental order scheduling a condemna-
tion hearing. In addition, Green and his roommate testified about
numerous defects which they had brought to Sumski's attention but
1. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
2. Id. at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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which had not been repaired.8 The landlord did not contest the
existence of these defects but claimed that they were not a defense
in an unlawful detainer action.
The trial judge agreed with the landlord and held that Green's
sole remedy was the "repair and deduct" provisions of Civil Code
Sections 1941 and 1942. 4 The district court of appeal summarily
denied Green's request for an extraordinary writ but the supreme
court issued an alternative writ of mandate staying the execution
of the trial court's decision and agreed to hear the case.
The California Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision written
by Justice Tobriner, recognized the traditional common law rule
that a landlord was under no duty to place leased premises in a
habitable condition and owed no obligation to repair the premises.
The court concluded, however, that the principles which formed the
basis for this rule were no longer viable.5 In reaching this decision,
the court placed much emphasis on the changes which had taken
place in the conditions under which real property is leased.0 In
most leases of urban property the land itself plays a minor role.
Therefore it is unrealistic to treat such a lease as a conveyance of
an interest in land. The better theory is that the lease is a contract
for a place to live.7 In addition, the design of a modern apartment
makes it more difficult for the tenant to conduct an adequate in-
spection of the premises, which was one of the reasons for the
common law rule. Such apartments are also difficult to repair and
3. These defects included:
(1) the collapse and non-repair of -the bathroom ceiling, (2) the
continued presence of rats, mice, and cockroaches on the premises,
(3) the lack of any heat in four of the apartment's rooms, (4)
plumbing blockages, (5) exposed and faulty wiring, and (6) an
illegally installed and dangerous stove. Id. at 621, 517 P.2d at 1170,
Ill Cal. Rptr. at 706 (footnote omitted).
4. These sections provide as follows:
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human be-
ings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it
into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent
dilipidations thereof, which render it untenantable, except such as
are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and twenty nine. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1970).
(a) If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor of dilapi-
dations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee
may repair the same himself, where the cost of such repairs does
not require an expenditure greater than one month's rent of the
premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent,
or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case he shall be
discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other
conditions. This remedy shall not be available to the lessee more
than once in any 12-month period. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942 (West
1970), as amended, (West Supp. 1974).
5. 10 Cal. 3d at 628, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
6. Id. at 624-25, 517 P.2d at 1173-74, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
7. Id. at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
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the average tenant does not possess adequate knowledge to make
such repairs.
For these reasons, the court believed that it was appropriate to
discard the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor as to residential
leases. Consequently the court stated that contract principles, in-
cluding the mutual dependency of covenants, should henceforth
apply in all such leases.8
The court went on to compare this "new" contract with other con-
tracts in which implied warranties have been found.9 The court
found that the same rationale also applied to residential leases. A
tenant has little bargaining power due to the scarcity of adequate
low-cost housing.10 The enactment of housing codes shows that the
trend of public policy is toward protecting the tenant. Therefore
a tenant should be able to reasonably expect that the product which
he purchases is fit for the purpose for which he buys it. In order
to protect the tenant's reasonable expectations, the court held that
all residential leases in California contained an implied warranty
that the landlord would maintain the premises in a habitable state
for the duration of the lease.1 The court recognized that its
holding' 2 was in line with a substantial minority of jurisdictions
whose courts have recently reached the same conclusion.13
8. Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
9. Id. at 626-27, 517 P.2d at 1174-75, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
10. Id. at 625, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
11. Id. at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
12. The court indicated in a footnote that it was not deciding the question
of whether the tenant has any remedy for defects which exist at the time
of the initial renting. Thus its holding only covers the landlord's failure
to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. -1d. at 621 n.3, 517 P.2d
at 1170-71, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07.
13. The court cited cases from eight other jurisdictions: Pines v. Pers-
sion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Marini v. Ireland,
56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248
(1971); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 fI1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Mease v. Fox, - Iowa -, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Boston Housing Authority
v. Hemmingway, - Mass. -, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). 10 Cal. 3d at 619 n.1,
517 P.2d at 1169, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 705. In addition to these cases, courts
in five other jurisdictions recognize an implied covenant of habitability in
residential leases. Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919
(Mun. Ct. 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct.
1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Steele v. Lati-
mer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974).
THE IMPICATIoNs OF Green FOR A LANDLORD'S
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
Common Law Rule
At early common law a landlord was immune from tort liability
for injuries resulting from a defect in the premises.14 The rationale
underlying this rule was that a tenant received an interest in the
land and thus was in control of the land. The landlord only re-
tained a reversionary interest and had no right to enter the prem-
ises until the lease expired.1' Consequently the courts held that
the landlord was under no duty to the tenant.' 6
Because of the harsh results under this rule in cases of injuries
to tenants and other persons on the premises, the courts created
several judicial exceptions to it. These exceptions seem to fit
within six categories: 7 when the landlord is aware of a concealed
defect existing on the premises at the time the tenant takes poss-
ession;' 8 when the landlord covenants in the lease to repair the
premises;' 9 when the injury occurs in a common area over which the
landlord maintains control;20 when the premises are to be used for
a public purpose; 2 ' when the landlord negligently repairs the
14. See W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 104 (3d ed. 1939).
15. PROSSER at 400.
16. E.g., Brewster v. DeFremery, 33 Cal. 341, 347 (1867).
17. See PROSSEa § 63; 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 234[2]
(1973). The standard phrase used by the California courts is that the land-
lord is not liable in "the absence of fraud, concealment, covenant in the
lease, or statutory duty to repair.. . ." Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App.
3d 58, 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476 (1972). See also Del Pino v. Gualtieri,
265 Cal. ApD. 2d 912, 919-20, 71 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (1968); Gustin v. Wil-
liams, 255 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 929, 931-32, 62 Cal. Rptr. 838, 839 (1967); Lee
v. Giosso, 237 Cal. App. 2d 246, 247-48, 46 Cal. Rptr. 803, 804 (1965). How-
ever, this quote does not accurately state the existing law. The six excep-
tions used in the text are those which have been recognized by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.
18. See, e.g., Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) (landlord's
duty is to disclose); Anderson v. Shuman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 272, 64 Cal. Rptr.
662 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT].
19. See, e.g., Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 18 P. 260 (1888); Lee v. Giosso,
237 Cal. App. 2d 246, 46 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1965); Metcalf v. Chiprin, 217 Cal.
App. 2d 305, 31 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1963); RESTATEMENT § 357.
20. See, e.g., Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr.
772 (1962); Burks v. Blackman, 52 Cal. 2d 715, 344 P.2d 301 (1959); Harris v.
Joffe, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 170 P.2d 454 (1946); Bock v. Hamilton Square Baptist
Church, 219 Cal. 284, 26 P.2d 7 (1933); RESTATEMENT § 360.
21. See, e.g., Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 240 P.2d 580
(1952); Burroughs v. Ben's Auto Park, Inc., 27 Cal, 2d 449, 164 P.2d 897
(1945); RESTATEMENT § 359.
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premises; 22 and when a statutory duty to repair exists.23 California
courts have consistently followed the traditional common law rule
as modified by these exceptions.
24
The Viability of the Common Law Rule in California after Green
Suppose the facts of Green are altered slightly. Sumski rents
an apartment to Green who signs a one year lease which contains
no covenant to repair by either party. The premises contain no
defects when Green moves in. A few months later, Green notices
that the bathroom ceiling is cracked. Green notifies Sumski of the
defect and asks him to repair it. A reasonable time passes without
the landlord making the repairs. Green is then injured by some
plaster which falls from the bathroom ceiling and sues Sumski for
personal injuries alleging negligence in his failure to make the
repairs.
In view of the above discussion concerning the common law rule
of a landlord's liability in tort,25 it would seem that the California
Supreme Court, if confronted with this fact situation, would have
four options available. The first one would be to fit the facts of
the case into one of the recognized exceptions to the rule of landlord
tort immunity. The only exception which seems relevant is the
22. See, e.g., Callahan v. Loughran, 102 Cal. 476, 36 P. 835 (1894); Mino-
letti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972); Janofsky v.
Garland, 42 Cal. App. 2d 655, 109 P.2d 750 (1941); RESTATEMENT § 362.
23. California courts have held that violations of labor codes, building
codes or local safety ordinances may result in tort liability. See Halliday
v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 488-90, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267, 272-73 (1966) and
cases cited therein. See also Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409,
218 P.2d 17 (1950); Grant v. Hipsher, 257 Cal. App. 2d 375, 64 Cal. Rptr.
892 (1967). The courts disagree on what the landlord's duty is. In McNally
v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961), the court held that
a violation of a local housing ordinance results in tort liability if the land-
lord fails to make a reasonable inspection. On the other hand, in Morris
v. Oney, 217 Cal. App. 2d 864, 32 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1963), the court held that
a landlord who violated the California Health and Safety Code was liable
in tort only if he had notice of the violation.
24. As discussed in note 23 supra, the "statutory duty to repair" exception
applies only to some statutes. It is settled law in California that Civil Code
section 1941 (West 1970) does not impose tort liability. See Gately v.
Campbell, 124 Cal. 520, 57 P. 567 (1899); Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563
(1881); Gustin v. Williams, 255 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 929, 62 Cal. Rptr. 838
(1967); Colburn v. Shuravlev, 24 Cal. App. 2d 898, 74 P.2d 1060 (1938).
25. See text at 404-05, supra.
statutory duty to repair. Since a cracked ceiling does not appear
to violate any housing code,26 Green would have to convince the
court to reinterpret Civil Code Section 194127 and hold that it does
impose tort liability on landlords. In view of the strong precedents
to the contrary,28 the court probably would be unwilling to adopt
such a position.
A second alternative would be for the court to hold that the fact
situation does not come within any of the established exceptions
to the common law rule and therefore Green could not recover in
tort from the landlord. In Green, however, the court indicated a
willingness to depart from ancient common law rules in landlord-
tenant law. Since the rationale for the common law rule of land-
lord tort immunity is closely related to the rationale for the
common law rule that a lease contains no implied covenant of habit-
ability,29 the court probably would be inclined toward allowing the
tenant to recover. As in Green, the court could rely on recent
developments in landlord-tenant law.80
The court's third option would be to create a new exception to
the common law rule. This could be done by holding that the
implied warranty creates a duty in the landlord to repair all defects
of which he has notice.31 Any failure to repair would result in
liability if the tenant were injured as a result of this defect. The
difficulty with this exception is that it probably would be limited
to those defects which render the premises uninhabitable. A
cracked ceiling is not such a defect and thus Green would not be
able to recover from Sumski. Another reason why the court is not
likely to adopt this option is that in the past it has disfavored, and
rightly so, creating new exceptions to outmoded rules.3 2
The final alternative available to the court would be to abrogate
the common law rules and utilize general negligence principles in
landlord-tenant law. This is the option which the court is most,
likely to adopt.
26. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17921 et seq. (West 1964), as
amended, (West Supp. 1974); 25 CAL. Anmq. CODE §§ 1060-1090.
27. See note 4, supra.
28. See note 24, supra.
29. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
30. See text at 407-10, infra.
31. Although the court in Green granted the tenant a reduction in rent
and did not expressly require the landlord to repair the premises, a subse-
quent court could readily hold that the implied warranty creates a duty
in the landlord to repair the premises. See Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal.
App. 2d 482, 485, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267, 270 (1966) where the court indicated
that a breach of an implied warranty in a lease could result in tort liability.
32. See Rowland v. Christiah, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118-19, 443 P,2d 561, 568, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968),
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Recent Developments Favoring the Adoption of General Negligence
Principles in Landlord-Tenant Law
In Rowland v. Christian33 the California Supreme Court held that
an occupier of land was liable in accordance with general negligence
principles for injuries suffered by persons on the premises.34 The
court discarded the distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and
invitees which under the common law determined the duties of an
occupier of land.35 The court held that the possessor of land owed
the same duty of reasonable care to any person who came on the
land. The person's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee was
only relevant in determining if the occupier had breached his duty
of reasonable care.3 6
The supreme court gave two reasons for its decision in Rowland.
The first was that the historical basis for the distinctions between
trespasser, licensee, and invitee was no longer valid. The court be-
lieved that these distinctions, which resulted from the dominance
of the landowning class in feudal England, were unsupportable in
an industrialized, urban society and caused confusion. 37
The second reason which the court gave for its decison in Row-
land was that the policy set forth in California Civil Code Section
1714 should be followed absent any strong policy considerations to
the contrary.38 This section provides:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts,
but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary
care or skill in the management of his property or person, except
so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself.39
The court concluded that the factors which may warrant departure
in particular cases from this fundamental principle did not justify




34. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
35. Id. at 118-19, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
36. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
37. Id. at 113, 117, 443 P.2d at 564-65, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01, 103.
38. Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1970).
40. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. Rowland has
been followed by courts in five other jurisdictions. See Pickard v. City
The recent decision of the California Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc. 41 indicates that
both grounds of Rowland also apply to the issue of landlord tort
liability. In Brennan the tenant was injured when a railing broke
while he was descending a stairway. The defect in the railing was
concealed but the facts indicated \that the landlord could have dis-
covered the defect by making a reasonable inspection. The trial
court instructed the jury that if they found that the landlord did
not have actual knowledge of the defect then they must return a
verdict for him. The court of appeal held that the trial judge erred
in his instruction because Rowland had changed the common law
rules concerning landlord tort liability.
42
While recognizing that the supreme court had not answered the
precise issue posed in Brennan, the court of appeal believed that
the rationale used in Rowland applied to landlord-tenant law. The
court reiterated that Civil Code Section 1714 established the basic
policy of the state. The only major distinction between the case
then before the court and Rowland was that a landlord did not
occupy the land. The court did not believe that this distinction
justified an exception to the policy of section 1714.43 The court
also believed that dictum from Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co."
indicated that the supreme court intended to apply Rowland to
landlord-tenant law. Consequently the court held that the common
law rule of landlord tort immunity was no longer justified and
questions of possession and control of the premises would only be
relevant as they relate to such basic tort issues as the foreseeability
and unreasonableness of a particular risk of harm.4" Henceforth
"a landlord must act toward his tenant as a reasonable person under
all circumstances ....)46
The recent case of Sargent v. Ross 47 also supports the conclusion
that general negligence principles should apply in landlord-tenant
& County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Mounsey v. El-
lard, - Mass. -, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc.,
469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo.
537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639
(1972).
41. 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973).
42. Id. at 802, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
43. Id. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
44. 7 Cal. 3d 170, 179, 496 P.2d 1276, 1281, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908, 913 (1972).
The court also cited Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 103 Cal. Rptr.
528 (1972) where the court held that existing law was adequate to conclude
that the landlord was liable for repairs negligently performed but went on
to say that the principles established in Rowland also applied.
45. 35 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
46. Id. at 800-01, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
47. 113 N.I-. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
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law. In Sargent the New Hampshire Supreme Court abolished the
common law rules and held that a landlord "must exercise reason-
able care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm."48
In Sargent the plaintiff's four-year-old daughter died as the result
of a fall from a stairway leading from an apartment owned by the
defendant. The main issue -was whether the landlord had main-
tained control over the stairway. Rather than distorting the facts
to find that the landlord had maintained control, the court decided
to change the common law rule of landlord tort immunity. "We
think that now is the time for the landlord's limited tort immunity
to be relegated to the history books where it more properly
belongs." 49 In place of the old rule, general negligence principles
would apply.
The rationale used by the court in Sargent should be persuasive
in California because of the Green decision. The New Hampshire
court stated that its holding sprang "naturally and inexorably"' 0
from its recent decision in Kline v. Burns51 holding that all apart-
ment leases contained an implied covenant of habitability. By dis-
carding the principle of caveat emptor from landlord-tenant law,
the Kline decision had eliminated "the very legal foundation and
justification for the landlord's immunity in tort for injuries to the
tenant or third persons. '52 The court believed that its decision to
impose general negligence principles was the final step in "bring-
[ing] up to date the other half of landlord-tenant law"53 and
concluded that its holding was in line with its decisions abrogating
rules of tort immunity in other areas.54 Likewise the California
48. Id. at -- 308 A.2d at 534.
49. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 533.
50. Id. This conclusion may be subject to some criticism since none of
the other courts which recognize an implied covenant of habitability in resi-
dential leases (see cases cited note 13, supra) have abrogated the common
law rules of landlord tort liability. See Recent Developments, Sargent v.
Ross: Abrogation of Landlord's Tort Immunity, 1974 DuKE L.J. 175, 184-
85 n.46. The probable reason for this is that an appropriate fact pattern has
not yet come before these courts. See DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp.,
- Mass. -, 306 N.E.2d 432 (1974) holding that the "retained control" excep-
tion was sufficient to make the landlord liable. However, the court went
on to say that it "might well be inclined toward a reconsideration of the
rules of tort liability of lessors ... if the decision in this case required it."
Id. at -, 306 N.E.2d at 434.
51. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
52. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, -, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).
53. Id.
54. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 533.
Supreme Court has abrogated tort immunities in most areas of the
law.55 In addition, the rationale used by the court in Green seems
to erode, if not eliminate, the foundation for the rule of landlord
tort immunity.
Thus, a reading of the Green decision in conjunction with the
sound reasoning used by the courts in Rowland, Brennan, and
Sargent indicates that the California Supreme Court is likely
to apply general negligence principles to landlord-tenant law.r0
Therefore in a situation such as the one used in the previous ex-
ample where a landlord fails to repair the defect within a reason-
able time after notice, the tenant should be allowed to present his
case to the jury based on general negligence principles.
5 7
THE ImPLICATIONS OF Green FOR STRICT
LiABmITY OF LANDLORDS
Products Liability5 s
Prior to 1963, courts which imposed strict liability on manufactur-
55. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, (1971)
(parental immunity); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 102 (1962) (interspousal immunity for negligence); Self v. Self, 58
Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (interspousal immunity
for intentional torts); Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (sovereign immunity); Silva v. Provi-
dence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939) (charitable immunity).
56. In addition, any exculpatory clause in the lease releasing the landlord
from tort liability should be declared void as contrary to public policy. Al-
though California courts have upheld the validity of such clauses, see Ste-
phens v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 Cal. 86, 41 P. 783 (1895); Fields v. City
of Oakland, 137 Cal. App. 2d 602, 291 P.2d 145 (1955); Werner v. Knoll,
89 Cal. App. 2d 474, 201 P.2d 45 (1948), the court in Green indicated that,
because of the landlord's superior bargaining power, any attempted waiver
of the implied covenant of habitability would be void as violating public
policy. 10 Cal. 3d at 625 n.9, 517 P.2d at 1173-74, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
This same reasoning also should apply to any attempt by the landlord to ex-
culpate himself from tort liability. See also MODEL RESiDENTrAL LANDLORD-
TENANT CODE § 2-406 (Tent. Draft 1969) entitled "Landlord's Waiver of Lia-
bility Forbidden."
57. This holding does not assure a verdict for the tenant since the land-
lord still has the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
The landlord could argue that by failing to take advantage of the "repair
and deduct" provisions in Civil Code section 1942 (West 1970), the tenant
had assumed the risk of the defects. This argument is not likely to be per-
suasive since the most logical reading of section 1942 indicates that the rem-
edies which it allows tenants are optional. Thus the section is not intended
to relieve the landlord from his duty to maintain the premises in a habitable
condition.
58. This section is only meant to be a brief summary of products liability
law. For a more detailed discussion and a survey of cases see, e.g., Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opin-
ion); POSSER, supra note 14, at §§ 96-104; Prosser, The Assault upon the
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ers and retailers of products used an implied warranty rationale. 9
Strict liability in tort appeared in 1963 with the landmark case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.6 0 The doctrine established
in Greenmzan evolved from the problems that sometimes accompa-
nied the implied warranty rationale.61 In Greenman the court held
that "the liability is not one governed by the law of contract war-
ranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."62 The rationale
for the holding was that public policy demanded that the manu-
facturer should bear the risks of injuries caused by its defective
products.
0 3
Since Greenman, the California Supreme Court has extended the
strict liability in tort concept beyond the manufacturer and retailer
of products. In Price v. Shell Oil Co.64 the court held that a lessor
of personal property was strictly liable in tort for any injuries
caused by a defect in the leased product.65 Concluding that "the
paramount policy to be promoted ... is the protection of otherwise
defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading
throughout society of the cost of compensating them,"6 6 the court
Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1966); Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer
in California, 18 HASTI Ns L.J. 9 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965). For
an excellent article comparing the growth of products liability to landlord-
tenant law see Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-
Lessor, 21 HASTI s L.J. 458 (1970).
59. The leading case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960), held that a person not in privity with the manufacturer
could recover for injuries caused by a breach of an implied warranty. The
two reasons used by the court were the inequality in bargaining position
between the consumer and the manufacturer, and the social policy that
manufacturers should only put safe products on the market. Id. at 384, 161
A.2d at 83.
60. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
61. These problems included privity, notice of defect, and disclaimers by
the manufacturers. However, Dean Prosser points out that the results from
both theories are the same as long as the courts realize that the implied
warranty theory is not based on any contract notions. PnossER, supra note
14, at 658. See also Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429
(N.D. Ind. 1965) where the court stated that strict liability in tort is "hardly
more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the con-
tract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect, and
limitation through inconsistencies with express warranties."
62. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
63. Id.
64. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
65. Id. at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
66. Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
held that no substantial difference exists between the seller of per-
sonal property and the lessor of such property. 7 The court limited
its holding, however, to a lessor who was in the business of leasing
in the same sense as a seller who was in the business of manufactur-
ing or retailing.68
California lower appellate courts also have applied the Greenman
holding in the field of real property. In Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,
Inc.69 the court held that mass builders of new homes were strictly
liable in tort for property damage suffered by the buyer as a result
of a defect in the construction of the house.70 The court stated
that no meaningful distinction exists between the mass production
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automo-
biles. 71
Avner v. Longridge Estates72 extended the strict liability in tort
doctrine to a seller of lots for a defective condition in the land
itself.73 Although the California Supreme Court has not decided
the precise issues presented in Kriegler and Avner, it has cited both
cases with approval on several occasions.
7 4
The strict liability in tort concept also has been extended into
the landlord-tenant field. In Fakhoury v. Magner76 a California
District Court of Appeal applied the rule established in Price to
hold a landlord strictly liable for injuries suffered by the tenant
as a result of defects in the furniture which the landlord had leased
with the apartment.76 The court believed that there was no sound
basis for making an exception to Price merely because the relation-
ship between the two parties was landlord and tenant.77 The court
emphasized, however, that the decision dealt with holding a land-
lord in the business of renting furnished apartments strictly liable
for the defective furniture and not for the defective premises.78
67. Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
68. Id. at 254, 466 P.2d at 728, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
69. 269 Cal. Apn. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rntr. 749 (1969).
70. Id. at 229, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
71. Id. at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
72. 272 Cal. Amp. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
73. Id. at 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
74. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 378, 525
P.2d 88, 90, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 650, (1974); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 130, 501 P.2d 1153, 1160, 104 Cal. Rvtr. 433, 440 (1972); Price
v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 254, 466 P.2d 722, 728, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
184 (1970). Both cases were also cited by the court in Green. 10 Cal. 3d
at 626, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
75. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
76. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
77. Id. at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
78. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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Taken together, these developments indicate that the concept of
strict liability in tort may be applicable to other aspects of the
landlord-tenant relationship.
The Rationale of Green is Consistent with the Rationale for
Imposing Strict Liability in Tort
Suppose the facts of the previous example are changed as follows:
The apartment that Sumski rents to Green is one in a complex
of twenty apartments. Sumski owns all of the apartments and
his sole source of income is the leasing of these apartments. Each
year Sumski hires a qualified electrical contractor to inspect the
premises. A few months after moving in, Green is injured when
he receives a shock while turning on a light in his apartment.
Green sues Sumski for damages and can prove that the reason he
received the shock was that the wiring in his apartment was de-
fective. Green alleges that Sumski should be held strictly liable.
This article has previously considered the two theories which
courts have used in imposing strict liability on manufacturers and
retailers of products. 79 The basis for both these theories is that
a consumer should be adequately protected from injuries caused
by defective products. The Green decision indicates that the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court now considers the average, modern-day ten-
ant to be no different than any other consumer. "In most sig-
nificant respects, the modern urban tenant is in the same position
as any other normal consumer of goods."80 The court also makes
reference to problems of tenants that plague all consumers. These
problems include inadequate opportunity to inspect the premises,
inferior bargaining power and insufficient knowledge to conduct an
informed inspection even when the opportunity is available.81 The
79. See text accomnanying notes 59-63, supra.
80. 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711. The court
also quoted Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). "When American city dwellers,
both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known package
of goods and services .... " 10 Cal. 3d at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 708.
81. 10 Cal. 3d at 624-25, 517 P.2d at 1173-74, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10. A
recent newspaper article illustrates that the tenant's bargaining power is
virtually nonexistent. In discussing the trend of families to rent, the article
states:
But even that recourse soon may be denied families because of
another development in the crisis-prone housing market: A short-
court's reference to a landlord as one who "sells"8 2 a product also
indicates its belief that a tenant deserves the same protections as
any other consumer.
Language in Green also suggests that the risk distribution basis
of Greenman is present in the landlord-tenant field. In discussing
the widespread enactment of housing codes in California, the court
states:
These comprehensive housing codes affirm that, under contempo-
rary conditions, public policy compels landlords to bear the primary
responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing in
our state.83
Once the court admits that this is the policy, the next question
which must be answered is how far should the court go to imple-
ment this policy. The language used in Green, when read in con-
junction with the Greenman rationale, indicates that the court
should be willing to impose strict liability in tort on commerical
lessors of residential property.
The underlying basis of Greenman was that the manufacturer
who was reaping the economic benefits by placing its product on
the market should bear the cost of injuries caused to consumers
by defects in the product.8 4 In addition, the manufacturer is better
able to afford the cost of insurance and can pass on most, if not
all, of this cost to the general public.8 5
Now that the court classifies a tenant as a consumer, the Green-
man rationale is equally applicable to the leasing of residential
apartments. The commerical landlord places a product on the mar-
ket from which he derives significant economic gain. Although the
landlord's initial investment in the premises may be substantial,
this investment will ultimately return to him in the form of rent,
and frequently through the increased market value of the premises.
In addition, if the landlord incurs any increased expenses, such as
an increase in property taxes or maintenance costs, he will normally
age of rental units is showing up in many of the nation's major
housing markets.
In a survey of 17 major local markets throughout the country,
the va,'ancy rate for modern rental units was under 5 per cent in
more than half. In Washington, the vacancy rate was recorded at
zero. San Diego Union, Sept. 19, 1974, at D-10, col. 6.
82. 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
85. Although there is no srecific mention of the insurance factor in
Greenman, there is no doubt that the court had it in mind. See Price v.
Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 725-26. 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
181-82 (1970); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 587, 451
P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969),
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pass them on to his tenants in the form of higher rent. Significant
tax advantages also are available to the landlord as the owner of
the property.
86
Like the manufacturer of a product, the commerical landlord is
in a better position than the average tenant to purchase liability
insurance. The average tenant often is not able to afford adequate
health, medical or liability insurance.87 This results in inadequate
compensation for a tenant or other person who is injured as a result
of a defect in the premises. In addition, the cost of insurance is
a tax deductible expense for the landlord.8 8
These factors lead to the conclusion that the economic considera-
tions which the California Supreme Court relied on to impose strict
liability in tort on manufacturers, retailers and lessors of personal
property are also present in the commercial leasing of urban
residences.
Strict Liability Does Not Mean Absolute Liability
Strict liability for commercial landlords of urban residences
would be subject to the same limitations which exist in products
liability. Thus the landlord could use the defenses of assumption
of risks9 or abuse of the product.9 0 In addition, the plaintiff would
86. See SLITOR, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX IN RELATION TO HOUSING (Re-
search Report No. 5 to National Commission on Urban Problems, 1968) re-
printed in part in D. MANDELKER & R. MONTGOMERY, HOUSING IN AMERICA
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 357-65 (1973). The article begins with the fol-
lowing statement:
A combination of key factors including the interplay of tax and
non-tax variables-results in important tax savings and related in-
vestment gains in rental real estate. These advantages arise from
favorable tax depreciation, the use of relatively thin equity and
heavy mortgage financing, with reduced or deferred taxation of
gains on the disposition of the investment. Id. at 357.
For specific income tax deductions available to landlords, see INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 162-64, 167.
87. In 1969 the median income for renter occupied households was $6,317.
The comrarable figure for owner occupied households was $9,711. BUREAU
OF CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF
HOUSING, SUBJEcT REPORTS: CHARACTERISTIcs BY HOUSEHOU COMPOSITION,
Table A-3 at 21 (1973).
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
89. See Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1972); Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570,
97 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1971).
90. See Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr.
have to show that he was a member of the class of persons which
strict liability was meant to protect, that the landlord leased resi-
dential premises as a continuing course of business and that a defect
in the premises was a proximate cause of the injury.91 If the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decides to impose strict liability in tort in
the landlord-tenant field, it could rely on its decisions in products
liability to define each of these elements.
1. What Persons Should Be Able to Recover Based on Strict
Liability?
Initially in products liability only users or consumers were able
to rely on strict liability in tort.02 This position was first expanded
in 1965 to include a bystander who was injured by an exploding
gun.93 California adopted this rule in Elmore v. American Motors
Corp.94 where the court allowed the driver of a car who was injured
as a result of an accident caused by a defect in another car to re-
cover from the manufacturer of the defective car. In extending
coverage to bystanders, the court reasoned that the purpose of im-
posing strict liability was to make the industry responsible for all
foreseeable harm caused by defective products with the cost of these
losses ultimately being distributed to the general public. Con-
sequently, the bystander is entitled to as much, if not more, pro-
tection than the user or consumer. 5 The effect of this holding is
to put strict liability on the same footing as negligence as to all
foreseeable injuries.
96
Analogizing the Elmore holding to the landlord-tenant field in-
dicates that any person who could foreseeably be injured by a defect
in the premises could rely on strict liability in a suit against the
landlord. This rule would include tenants, salesmen, guests, and
anyone else lawfully on the premises.97 Such a broad class of
319 (1970); Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co., 243 Cal. App.
2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966); Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App.
2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966).
91. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A, comment f at 350-51, com-
ment g at 351, comment I at 354.
92. See PRossEa, supra note 14, at 662; RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment
I at 354.
93. Piercefield v. Remington Arms" Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965).
94. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84,.75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
95. Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
96. See PaossER at 663.
97. Trespassers would not be included since normally they are not rea-
sonably foreseeable. The common law categories of licensee, invitee and
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potential plaintiffs does not unreasonably expose landlords to
liability since standard liability insurance covers injuries to these
persons.98
2. What Landlords Should Be Covered by Strict Liability?
The general rule in products liability is that any person "engaged
in the business of selling products" 99 is subject to strict liability.
The California courts apply the rule to any person who engages
in selling or leasing products as a "continuous course of busi-
ness."' 00  This same requirement should be carried over to the
landlord-tenant field. The courts have already given some indica-
tion as to whom they consider to be a commercial landlord of
residential premises.
In Conroy v. 10 Brewster Avenue Corp.10 1 a New Jersey court
held that a lessor of a two family dwelling was not a mass producer
or mass lessor such as to allow recovery in tort for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability.10 2 In Fakhoury v. Magner'0 3 a
California court of appeal held that a person who leases five apart-
ments at one time was engaged in leasing as a continuing course
of business.10 4  The California legislature also has given some
guidance in this area. California Code of Civil Procedure Section
580b provides:
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real
property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of
sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor
to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real
property .... 105
trespasser would still be relevant to determine if the injured party was a
foreseeable plaintiff. The court in Rowland indicated that the categories
could still be used for this purpose. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70
Cal. Rptr. at 104.
98. See 11 G. CoucH, COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 44:373 (2d ed. 1963); 4
G. PicHARDs, RIcHARDS ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE, app. N at 2095 (5th ed.
1952).
99. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment f at 350-51.
100. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 253, 466 P.2d 722, 727, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 178, 183 (1970).
101. 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (1967).
102. Id. at -, 234 A.2d at 418.
103. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
104. Id. at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
105. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 580b (West 1967).
In 1963 this statutory prohibition was extended to include third
party lenders where the funds are used to purchase a "dwelling for
not more than four families."'10 6 Thus section 580b now allows third
party lenders to recover deficiencies from non-residential pur-
chasers.107 Through this amendment the legislature has indicated
who it considers to be a commercial purchaser of real property. By
analogy, a commercial lessor of real property could be similarly
defined as anyone who simultaneously leases more than four resi-
dential dwelling units.
3. What Defects Should Be Included in Strict Liability?
The question of what constitutes a defect has been one of the
most litigated points in products liability. 08 The Restatement's def-
inition is that a defect is a "condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him.' ' 09 The definition of defect used by the California courts is
more closely related to some "deviation from the norm."" 0 In
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp."' the California Supreme Court ex-
pressly distinguished its definition of defect from the Restatement's
position. The court held that an injured person only has to show
that the product was defective and does not have to show that the
defect was an unreasonably dangerous one.112 Unfortunately the
court did not further clarify its definition of "defect." 1 3
To be consistent with its decision in Cronin, the court should hold
that an injured person could recover from a commercial landlord
of residential property for any defect in the premises which is a
proximate cause of the injury. This conclusion would encompass
defects in design"14 as well as defects in the "manufacturing" of
106. Id.
107. Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Be-
ing of the Law, 53 CALIF. L. Rnv. 151, 164 (963).
108. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at 660; Rheingold, Praof of Defect in
Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325 (1970).
109. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment g at 351.
110. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Prod-
ucts and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. R.v. 363, 367 (1965). In this article
Justice Traynor states that no definition has been found that would resolve
all cases. Id. at 367.
111. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
112. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
113. The court avoided the issue by making reference to Justice Traynor's
statement that a "cluster of useful precedents" exist which can be used to
determine whether a product is defective. Id. at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162,
104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
114. See Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1972); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Jininez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482
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the premises. This position is not as radical as it might seem ini-
tially as long as one remembers that the rationale for imposing
strict liability is independent of any concept of "fault" or "blame-
worthiness."' " 5
The court also must decide whether to impose strict liability for
all defects in the premises or for only those that exist when the
tenant takes possession. The rule in products liability is that the
product must be defective "at the time that it left the hands of
the particular seller."'1 6 The basis for this limitation is that the
manufacturer should bear only the cost of injuries caused by a
product which is defective when placed on the market." 7 However,
this rule has been relaxed in cases involving lessors of products.1
8
In Green the court based its decision on the policy that a landlord
should maintain the premises in a habitable condition. To be con-
sistent with this policy, the court should hold that commerical
landlords of residential premises are strictly liable for any defect
even though the defect arises after the tenant takes possession.
This conclusion would have the desirous result of encouraging land-
lords to make more frequent inspections of the premises, thus
lessening the possibility of injuries.
Arguments Against Imposing Strict Liability in Tort on Commercial
Landlords of Residential Premises
Most of the arguments against imposing strict liability in land-
lord-tenant law were recently considered by a New Jersey Court
of Appeals in Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc." 9 In Dwyer the
P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d
465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970). Arguably, the court could limit
the rule to those defects which constitute a breach of the implied covenant
of habitability. This conclusion is unlikely, however, in light of the holding
in Cronin. See text accompanying note 112, supra.
115. See PROSSER § 75.
116. RESTATEM-ENT § 402A. comment g at 351.
117. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
118. In Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970), the court allowed the plaintiff to recover for a defect in a ladder
which was installed four years after the parties entered into the lease. In
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 450-51, 212
A.2d 769, 778 (1965), the court indicated that a party could recover for a
defect even though it did not develop until after the lessee took possession.
119. 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (1973), affd per curiam, 63 N.J.
577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
plaintiff was a tenant in a multiple family dwelling1 20 and had been
scalded when the hot water faucet came out of the wall as she was
taking a bath. The evidence at trial showed that the faucet was
defective but that the landlord was not aware of it and could not
have discovered it by a reasonable inspection. The trial court found
that the landlord was strictly liable in tort for breach of the
implied covenant of habitability but the appellate court reversed.
Scrutiny of the reasons given by the appellate court indicates that
its conclusion was incorrect and should not be persuasive to the
California Supreme Court.
In Dwyer the court concluded that an apartment is unlike other
products because it is composed of several rooms and is constructed
by many workers. 121 This reasoning is not persuasive when one
considers that an apartment is no more complex than a new home
where strict liability in tort does apply to the commercial builder.
122
In addition, the number of persons needed to construct an apart-
ment probably does not differ significantly from the number of
laborers used on an assembly line to produce a new car.
Another reason given in Dwyer was that it would be unjust to
hold a landlord strictly liable for the entire time that a tenant is
in possession.1 23  The California Supreme Court, however, has
allowed parties to recover based on strict liability for injuries
suffered nine years after buying a product 24 and six years after
leasing one.' 25 In addition, a long time-lapse may benefit the land-
lord because of his defenses of assumption of risk or abuse of the
product. The crucial issue is not the time-lapse itself but whether
the defect was a proximate cause of the injury.
20
120. The Dwyer decision did not state how many apartments the defend-
ant leased. In a telephone conversation with the attorney for the tenant,
the writer learned that the defendant owned approximately fifty apart-
ments. Thus, the court's dictum that strict liability in tort should not apply
to the ordinary landlord of a multiple family dwelling, id. at -, 301 A.2d
at 467, is inconsistent with the authorities cited in the text accompanying
notes 101-04, supra. These authorities seem to present the better view.
121. 123 N.J. Super. at -, 301 A.2d at 467.
122. See text accompanying notes 69-71, supra. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court also has recognized this rule. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
123. 123 N.J. Super. at -, 301 A.2d at 467.
124. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972).
125. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1970).
126. In Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 644, 105
Cal. Rptr. 890, 898 (1972), the court stated that it could not declare as a
matter of law that a defect was not a proximate cause of the injury merely
because there was a fifteen-year interval between the date of manufacturing
and the date of injury.
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One other argument which the court relied on in Dwyer was that
imposing strict liability on landlords places an unusual and unjust
burden on them. 27 The first fallacy in this argument is that strict
liability would not be imposed on all landlords but only on commer-
cial landlords of residential property. 28 Secondly, the economic
advantages available to these landlords129 justify placing the costs
of injuries on them. They can then pass on this increased cost to
their tenants.
One other reason why the California Supreme Court should reach
a different conclusion than Dwyer is that, since the court follows
the risk distribution rationale of Greenman, 30 it should not con-
sider such factors as the tenant's reasonable expectations and
whether the landlord had received notice of the defect.' 3 1 Instead,
the California court would examine the economic factors in the
landlord-tenant field and should conclude that these factors justify
imposing strict liability on commercial landlords of residential
apartments.
A final argument against imposing strict liability in landlord-
tenant law is that any increase in insurance costs may force some
landlords to withdraw their property from the rental market.
However, this would not necessarily result in a decrease in the
supply of apartments. A landlord who is unwilling to incur any
additional insurance expenses will not keep an unoccupied apart-
ment. Rather he will sell it to someone already in or willing to
enter the rental business. The significant economic attractions of
residential rentals assure that someone will almost always be
willing to purchase the apartment.
The companion to the above argument is that imposing strict
liability on commercial landlords would result in an inordinate in-
crease in rent which the low income tenant hardly can afford.
127. 123 N.J. Super. at -, 301 A.2d at 467.
128. See text at 417-18, supra.
129. See note 86, supra.
130. In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Greenman rule. How-
ever, the court in Dwyer, by discussing such factors as the tenant's reason-
able expectations and the landlord's lack of notice of the defect, 123 N.J.
Super. at -, 301 A.2d at 467, demonstrated that the implied warranty ra-
tionale influenced its decision.
131. 123 N.J. Super. at -, 301 A2d at 467.
However, it does not seem that the per unit increase in rent would
be significant when compared with the more drastic alternatives
of mandatory health, medical and liability insurance for tenants
which would be needed to achieve the ultimate goal of full compen-
sation for persons injured by a defect in the premises.
Thus, the conclusion reached when the rationale of Green is
viewed in conjunction with other California decisions in products
liability is that the California Supreme Court should apply strict
liability in tort to commercial landlords of residential premises.
Consequently, in a situation such as the one in the previous example
where a tenant is injured as a result of a defect in the premises,
the commercial landlord should be liable even though he could not
have discovered the defect. 132
CONCLUSION
In Green the California Supreme Court recognized that drastic
changes have taken place in the landlord-tenant relationship.
These changes have undermined many of the common law prin-
ciples which still exist in landlord-tenant law. The court in Green
indicated a willingness to discard some of these outmoded prin-
ciples. The question of landlord tort liability will inevitably come
before the court and when it does the court again will confront
other outmoded rules. The court should abrogate these rules and
hold that general negligence principles apply. In addition, the court
should be willing, in appropriate cases, to impose strict liability on
commercial lessors of residential premises. This conclusion is not
132. Any clause in the lease by which the landlord attemuts to disclaim
liability or require indemnification by the tenant for injuries to third parties
would be strictly construed. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 258,
466 P.2d 722, 731, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 187 (1970). In Tunkl v. Regents of
University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963)
the court stated that one situation where an indemnification clause would
be invalid as violating public policy is if
[a]s a result of the essential nature of the service . . . the party
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining
strength against any member of the public who seeks his services.
Id. at 99-100, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38 (footnote
omitted).
However, the court in Tunkl also cited Barkett v. Brucato, 122 Cal. App.
2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953) for the proposition that exculpatory clauses in
leases are valid because the landlord-tenant relationship does not affect the
public interest. 60 Cal. 2d at 97, 383 P.2d at 444, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 36. The
validity of this proposition is questionable now that the California Supreme
Court has recognized that the residential tenant has a substantially inferior
bargaining position. See notes 56 and 81, supra. Thus, the court should
void any indemnification clause in a residential lease.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
as radical as it might initially seem 133 but rather is a logical exten-
sion of products liability law.
JAMS J. THOMSON, JR.
133. Louisiana has a statute which imposes strict liability on all lessors:
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects
of the thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it
should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and
defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have
arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee;
and if any loss should result to the lessee from the vices and de-
fect, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for the same. LA.
Civ. Com, art. (West 1952).
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